Ressentiment and Rationality

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthMore.htm

Elizabeth Murray Morelli

Loyola Marymount University

emorelli@lmumail.lmu.edu

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ABSTRACT: This paper is an investigation of the condition of ressentiment. It reviews the two most prominent philosophic accounts of ressentiment: Nietzsche's genealogy of ressentiment as the moral perversion resulting from the ancient Roman/Palestinian cultural conflict and giving birth to the ascetic ideal; and Scheler's phenomenology of ressentiment as a complex affective unit generative of its own affects and values. A single sketch of the typical elements of ressentiment is drawn from the review of these two accounts. One element in particular, the exigency of rationality, is highlighted. The rationality of ressentiment is found to be essential to the phenomenon as a whole and to its constitutive parts. Curiously, while their accounts imply and suggest the role of rationality, neither Nietzsche or Scheler make the centrality of rationality to ressentiment implicit.

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Ressentiment is a state of repressed feeling and desire which becomes generative of values. The condition of ressentiment is complex both in its internal structure and in its relations to various dimensions of human existence. While it infects the heart of the individual, it is rooted in our relatedness with others. On the one hand, ressentiment is a dark, personal secret, which most of us would never reveal to others even if we could acknowledge it ourselves. On the other hand, ressentiment has an undeniably public face. It can be creative of social practices, mores, and fashions; of scholarly attitudes, academic policies, educational initiatives; of political ideologies, institutions, and revolutions; of forms of religiosity and ascetic practices.

The concept of ressentiment was first developed systematically by Nietzsche in his account of the historical emergence of what he terms 'slave morality' and in his critique of the ascetic ideal. While references to this condition can be found throughout his works, the chief sections in which he develops this notion are in his early work The Genealogy of Morals. Max Scheler provides an eidetic account of this complex affective phenomenon in his book entitled Ressentiment. The picture of ressentiment that emerges from these two thinkers is in part a function of their methodological approaches and their abiding philosophic interests. Nietzsche's historical approach to the development and the corruption of morality is empiricist and deterministic, but it does not have the marks of the narrow positivism that emerged later. His historical method is informed by his philological training in ancient Hellenic texts and by Enlightenment ideals. So, although Nietzsche writes of cultural conflicts in the ancient world as historical fact, he actually uses them as models with universal anthropological significance. His account of the conflict between the Roman warrior class and the Palestinian priestly class is reminiscent of Hegel's master/slave dialectic and prefigures Freud's use of mythological models of conflict. Scheler's phenomenological approach to ressentiment aims at an understanding of the condition as a whole and in its constitutive elements. Scheler was concerned with grounding an a priori axiological ethics through a phenomenological typology of the field of affectivity. An account of the heart would not be complete without an investigation of the corrosive condition of ressentiment. His concern is not so much with the historical emergence of ressentiment but with its constitution as an affect, its relation to the objective hierarchy of values fundamental to his ethics, and its social and political significance. Scheler's approach, then, is more synchronic in contrast to Nietzsche's more diachronic approach. In spite of these significant differences in approach and emphasis, a single picture of ressentiment emerges from their works.

Before I sketch the nature of ressentiment, I should state the aim of this brief essay. My purpose is not simply to review the accounts provided by Nietzsche and Scheler, nor simply to offer an account of the nature of ressentiment, but to highlight an essential element of ressentiment which both of their accounts presuppose, but which neither makes explicit. I hope to show that rationality, or more precisely, an "exigence of rationality" (1) —a demand for and expectation of rational consistency, is a motive force of ressentiment.

One may not be surprised by the contention that rationality is the ground of science and analysis. In the Metaphysics Aristotle states that it is the task of the philosopher not only to analyze through the use of syllogisms, but also to examine the principles of syllogisms. He proceeds to formulate "the most certain principle of all—the most knowable, and absolute." It is that "the same person cannot at the same time hold the same to be and not to be." (2) Aristotle considered this principle of non-contradiction to be the origin of all axioms, the basis of all syllogistic analysis, the ultimate ground of all scientific knowledge. Similarly, one may not be surprised to read in Kant's Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals that the law of reason, this same law of non-contradiction, is the fundamental principle of his formal a priori ethics. It is this basic law of rationality which receives its moral formulation in the apodictic categorical imperative. (3) It is the rationality of the agent that makes her worthy of respect, and undergirds the practical imperative. It is not surprising that rationality would be found to be fundamental to science in general or to ethical knowledge specifically. What is curious is that rationality may also be essential to that most "irrational" perversion of morality—ressentiment. How could rationality be at the very core of affective corruption? Even the well-ordered heart, for Scheler, is non-rational, let alone the corrupt heart.

I intend to show how a rationality essential to ressentiment can be found in the very affects which give rise to and fuel ressentiment. As we will see, ressentiment always starts with and involves one or more negative feelings. Nietzsche's account of ressentiment focuses on the desire for revenge, and Scheler's account focuses on envy.

The story according to Nietzsche's account in the Genealogy is that the Palestinian Jewish rabbis constituted a noble class who believed that they had a special position as mediators between God and His chosen people. This station in life conferred on them a spiritual superiority to other Palestinians and to all non-Jews. The Romans who conquered them had a different set of values. They too saw themselves as noble, but their superiority consisted primarily in their physical might, their vital strength which enabled them to conquer and enslave others and occupy their lands. The Jewish priests resented the imposition of this Roman control over their lives, but they felt impotent to do anything about it. The brute power of the Romans particularly galled them, because they believed themselves to be their superiors intellectually and spiritually. The Roman warrior conquerors did not feel particularly resentful about the claims of spiritual superiority of the Jews, because these claims even if true in no way interfered with their own aspirations. The members of the noble Roman class were able to pursue and satisfy their desires and enjoy the kind of life they valued. The members of the noble Jewish class, meanwhile, felt their powerful positions unjustly usurped by their conquerors, but were unable to openly retaliate. The Jewish priests did not simply resign themselves in humility to their inferior social position. They had a deep sense of self-esteem and pride, and this fueled a simmering rage at their situation and hatred toward their conquerors. All of this, so far, according to Nietzsche is perfectly natural and understandable. The perversion and corruption enters in not with the ruthlessness and bloody violence of the conquerors nor with the frustration , rage, hatred, and desire for revenge of the conquered, but with the mendacity and self-deception to which the conquered ultimately resort. In order to maintain pride and a sense of superiority over their conquerors, the Palestinians both reaffirmed the value of the spiritual, and denied the values of vital might, political prestige and power, and worldly riches.

Christianity with other-worldly orientation and its ascetic practices represents for Nietzsche the crown of Jewish ressentiment, its most elaborate and perfect achievement. Nietzsche traces the birth of the Christian ideal to the following mechanism of ressentiment:

the Jews, that priestly people, who in opposing their enemies and conquerors were ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies' values, that is to say, an act of the most spiritual revenge. For this alone was appropriate to a priestly people, the people embodying the most deeply repressed priestly vengefulness. (4)

With the emergence of Christianity we have the successful slave-revolt in morality with its accompanying new set of values and virtues, and its underlying ascetic ideal. The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, esteemed, desired and possessed by the noble. It is the rejection of external goods such as honor and prestige, political power and influence, wealth, physical strength and beauty; and as well a disparagement of those virtues, especially courage and pride, characteristic of the Greco-Roman nobleman, Aristotle's megalopsychos. This devaluation is not simply an intellectual denial of their worth, but the gradual formation of negative affective responses to these goods and virtues. The goods and virtues associated with the despised nobility, themselves come to be hated as evil. (5) In the place of the negatively apprehended values, traits and devices found expedient for sheer survival of the weak are elevated to the status of goods and virtues. Thus, the weakness of the oppressed is transformed into virtue and the original power and strength of the noble is now considered evil and sinful.

Scheler is not concerned with the historical genealogy of ressentiment; instead, he describes the sociological conditions which foster it. Scheler considers ressentiment to arise as a function of the inequality in social conditions. While he would not consider the inequality of social positions to be unnatural—in fact, he considers it to be inevitable—one's response to this inequality can be more or less healthy, more or less corrupt. Drawing on the work of Simmel, he distinguishes two basic attitudes to perceived inequality—that of the noble man and that of the common man. It should be noted that while the categories, noble and common, are basically sociological, Scheler considers an individual of any socio-economic stratum, even of either gender, to be capable of nobility. But he does not believe that members of lower classes and women in general are typically blessed with nobility of spirit.

Both types compare themselves to others: "Each of us—noble or common, good or evil—continually compares his own value with that of others." (6) The common man derives his awareness of his relative worth through comparison with others, but the noble man enjoys an original sense of his own self-worth. The noble man's original self-confidence pre-conditions his apprehension of the values borne by others. Scheler distinguishes this non-reflective self-confidence from pride, which he views as a derivative, deliberate grasping at self-worth. Scheler here contributes a fine distinction not found in Nietzsche, for whom to be noble simply meant to be naturally proud. The immediate sense of self-worth is not experienced by the common man nor does he apprehend values independently of their being possessed by others. Scheler writes, "The noble man experiences value prior to any comparison, the common man in and through a comparison." (7) The common man's valuation is derivative. He watches the noble man and since he identifies the noble man with all that is good and desirable, he attaches value to whatever the noble man possesses.

Scheler further distinguishes two fundamental types of the common man: the arriviste represents the strong, energetic type and the man of ressentiment represents the weak. The arriviste vigorously pursues the goods and stations in life which are associated with the values possessed by the noble, but he does not pursue these goods for their intrinsic worth. His efforts are expended for the sake of being more highly esteemed than others. The insecurity of the arriviste is profound. He must unceasingly construct a sense of his worth through comparisons with others. Feelings of self-satisfaction are accumulated through looking down upon those he has surpassed, but these feelings are impermanent. The vision of those who surpass him continuously fuels his competitive drive. Scheler does not explicitly distinguish the arriviste from the aspiring noble man. I think we can conclude that the mark of nobility is not to have attained all the goods and bear all the values, but to aspire to those goods as intrinsically valuable, for their own sake and not for the sake of rising above others.

The second type of common man shares the ontological insecurity of the arriviste, but he feels a profound weakness. This is the man of ressentiment. His weakness is not fleeting; it does not come upon him like an illness, but he experiences it as a permanent condition of his existence. He feels fundamentally alienated from the values possessed by the noble man. He senses that there is an impassable divide between the object of desire and himself. The man of ressentiment differs little from the arriviste originally, but as Scheler's account reveals, his condition becomes increasingly complex.

The easiest way to review Scheler's eidetic description of the unit of affectivity, named ressentiment, is to describe it as if it emerges gradually in stages. Inasmuch as ressentiment functions as an underlying affective condition that permeates one's conscious intentionality, there is no simple experience or apprehension of ressentiment. It is manifested in myriad ways. Yet, this whole affective unit has a number of essential constituents. Initially there is a desire for the values apprehended as possessed by others and as borne by certain goods. For example, there are the values of physical strength, health, beauty, liberty, intelligence, wisdom, integrity, fidelity, and holiness. This list follows roughly the course of Scheler's a priori hierarchy of values. The mere apprehension of values possessed by others and borne by specific goods is not distinctive of the man of ressentiment. So far, as we have seen, the aspiring noble man and the arriviste also apprehend such values. We must add to this apprehension the fundamental sense of insecurity and lack of self-worth, which the man of ressentiment shares with the arriviste. What sets the man of ressentiment apart from the arriviste is his sense of impotence, his feeling of weakness. Yet, it is possible to feel incapable of striving for what one apprehends as valuable, and simply resign oneself to one's lot in life; and such resignation is not invariably unhappy, resentful, or despairing.

In order for ressentiment to take hold there must be the addition of certain negative affects in response to this perceived inability to attain what one so deeply desires . Nietzsche focuses on the negative feelings hatred and the desire for revenge in his genealogy. Scheler expands upon Nietzsche's account by offering us a tour through his own wax museum of affective horrors. He describes such negative affects as anger, rage, begrudging, rancor, spite, Schadenfreude, hatred, malice, the tendency to detract, jealousy, envy, resentment, desire for revenge. Ressentiment does not involve in every case all of these negative tendencies, desires and emotions, but it necessarily involves some such negative affect. Scheler provides a phenomenology of envy to exemplify the development of ressentiment.

Envy is itself a complex and cyclic emotion. It involves the apprehension of values possessed by another, a strong desire for those values, a feeling of impotence to attain those values, and a sense of injustice at this inability. A sense of injustice, as we have seen, grounded in an original sense of self-worth, underlies and fuels the desire for revenge. If one does not feel that one deserves to possess the desired value, then a feeling of impotence would simply lead to resignation. But with a notion of entitlement combined with a fundamental rational exigence for consistency, the apprehension of a desired value possessed by another leads one to the unspoken insistence: "Why can't I have that? I deserve that too!" When one feels, "I deserve that, by right, even more than that other one," a feeling of resentment emerges. But envy does not necessarily lead to resentment, and resentment alone is not ressentiment. The sense of injustice combined now with the persistent desire for the value and its continued frustration due to weakness and finitude naturally makes one angry. As these elements of envy interact, they are intensified and the anger can grow into a simmering rage. In the envious, rage is directed toward the other who possesses the desired value and grows into a hatred of that person or type of person. The more one's attention is directed towards the object of one's envy, the more impotent one feels and in fact becomes. Envy is an extremely stressful affective syndrome, which has no internal equilibrium or term. The rage ignites the desire, which is again thwarted by the feeling of powerlessness, and the simmering sense of unfairness rekindles the rage.

Envy becomes ressentiment when one convinces oneself that the envied values, which are beyond one's reach, are not really valuable after all:

To relieve the tension, the common man seeks a feeling of superiority or equality, and he attains his purpose by an illusory devaluation of the other man's qualities or by a specific "blindness" to these qualities. But secondly—and here lies the main achievement of ressentiment—he falsifies the values themselves which could bestow excellence on any possible object of comparison. (8)

The original desire for these values, however, and the negative feelings of rage and hatred for those who possess these values, are not eliminated through this devaluation. They are repressed to lead a subterranean life in the psyche. One is not conscious of one's own desire and one's own rage and spite. This repression successfully eliminates from consciousness the painful frustration of envy. One can even feel good about oneself; one can feel happy and superior to the poor individuals who possess the now devalued and ridiculed values.

Drawing on Nietzsche's and Scheler's accounts of ressentiment, we can sum up its internal structure. It is a cycle with the following constitutive elements: an original sense of self-worth; the apprehension of and desire for certain values; the frustration of one's desire for those values; a sense of impotence to achieve those values: a sense of the unfairness or injustice of not being able to attain them; anger, resentment, hatred towards the bearer of those values, and often a desire to seek revenge; the devaluation of the originally sought values; repression of the desire for the devalued values and of negative affects such as hatred, envy, desire for revenge; a feeling of superiority over those who seek and possess the now devalued values; and a confirmed sense of self-worth. Ressentiment is a cycle inasmuch as it recurs. The person of ressentiment relives the desires and feelings which constitute the condition even as these affects are repressed. The cycle of ressentiment, significantly, begins and ends with a sense of self-worth.

We found in Nietzsche's story of the ancient Palestinian nobility a wounded pride which fueled their vengefulness. Similarly, the sense of desert characteristic of envy is consistent with a feeling of self-worth. Scheler, however, omits this element from his account of envy, and consequently from his description of ressentiment. He begins his analysis with the distinction between the noble and the common man, and characterizes the latter as lacking a fundamental sense of self-worth. I think Nietzsche is closer to the mark in this regard. He argues that a desire for revenge is not typical of a slavish mentality. One who has no spirit, limited self-consciousness, and consequently is not enlightened as to her autonomy, tends to be content with her lot in life. To seek vengeance or feel envy one must have some sense of personal dignity, at least an inchoate notion that one deserves better simply because of being oneself.

According to Kant, the dignity and worth of a person is due to her rationality. One has worth not insofar as one acts rationally or thinks rationally, but because the law of reason is intrinsic to the self as a rational being. One may have worth a priori and yet not have any sense of self-esteem. The person of ressentiment, though, at least according to Nietzsche, is a person of pride, one who feels self-worth. And, as we have seen above, the envious person must also have a sense of self-worth in order to feel that she also deserves to possess what is possessed by the other. Thus, the person of ressentiment not only has intrinsic worth as a rational being, but also has a sense of her worth.

Rationality grounds the worth of the person and, conversely, a sense of self-worth leads to rational demands for consistency. If feels oneself to be worthy—as worthy as any other, then one deserves to possess the values enjoyed by the other. If the other robs me of my prestige and power, then the other deserves to suffer. Such sentiments fuel envy and the desire for revenge. The sense of fairness, justice, proper balance at work in these feelings is rooted in the basic law of reason. The perceived injustice of the situation would have no sting if one were content with inconsistency, if one did not have within a rational exigence. The fact that in envy, the desire for revenge, and the ressentiment which may ensue the use of one's reason is partial and faulty, does not diminish the essentially rational nature of these affects.

Further, the need for repression of the negative affects and the need to devalue the unattainable values are also a function of the rationality of the person of ressentiment. For example, it is necessary to repress the hatred one feels towards another only because it would be inconsistent with the friendly manner one wishes to adopt in their presence. Or, it is necessary to deny the value of an unattainable value only insofar as its desirability would be inconsistent with contentment in its absence. Again, the reasoning in these examples is partial and mistaken, but there is a demand for consistency that makes such machinations necessary.

My aim has been to point out the rationality inherent in ressentiment. The rational exigence, a demand for consistency, is found in justice sought through revenge, in the unfairness felt in envy, in the need to repress negative feelings and in the devaluation of values. Ressentiment is shot through with rationality. Is rationality the root of ressentiment? Am I contending that rationality is somehow the root of evil? I suspect that the root of the evil of ressentiment is ultimately unintelligible. Nevertheless, it is curious to find the thread of rationality woven through this notoriously irrational perversion of the non-rational heart.

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Notes

(1) The term 'rational exigence' or 'exigence of rationality' was formulated by Bernard Lonergan. See The Lonergan Reader, edited by Mark D. Morelli and Elizabeth A. Morelli (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 278, 382, 525.

(2) Aristotle, Met. IV 3 1005b 6-34.

(3) Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959) II. 420-22; 426-30.

(4) Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1969) I.8; 33-4.

(5) Nietzsche, Genealogy, I.10; 36.

(6) Scheler, Ressentiment, edited by Lewis A. Coser, translated by William W. Holdheim (New York: Schocken Books, 1961) 53.

(7) Ibid., 55.

(8) Ibid., 58.

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Ressentiment and Counter-Ressentiment: Nietzsche, Scheler,

and the Reaction Against Equality

by Nicholas Birns

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Page 1

Ressentiment and Counter-Ressentiment: Nietzsche, Scheler, and the Reaction Against Equality

by Nicholas Birns

One of the thorniest concepts in the Nietzschean lexicon is ressentiment. In order to understand

the strange trajectory of that term in English-speaking culture, we need, in an appropriately

Nietzschean way, to go into the term’s genealogy and the genealogy of Nietzsche’s canonicity in

the Anglophone world itself. Something we tend to forget in the English-speaking world is that

the first impact of Nietzsche was felt, broadly speaking, on the Left. In England, there was

George Bernard Shaw. In America, the leading Left-Nietzscheans were Jack London, whose

anguished vacillation between Nietzschean individualism and Marxist collectivism is recorded in

his vigorous and thoughtful novels, The Sea Wolf, and Martin Eden; and H. L. Mencken, who

saw Nietzsche as a prod in his savage, satiric debunking of complacent American truisms. The

Nietzschean vogue of the 1910s was ended less by the misappropriation of Nietzsche by the Nazis

in the 1930s than by the anti-German hysteria that erupted after the US entered the First World

War; even a thinker such as Nietzsche who would have been hardly enthusiastic about Germany’s

role in the war was deemed suspect. Much of the relativism of the 1920s, though, bore a

surreptitiously Nietzschean imprint–from the permissiveness of the Jazz Age to the “revolt against

the village” (to use Carl Van Doren’s phrase) of Sherwood Anderson and Sinclair Lewis. Literary

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figures such as, overtly, Eugene O‘Neill, and, covertly, Ernest Hemingway (whose ‘code’ has a

highly Nietzschean tinge to it) kept the Mencken-London tradition alive long after it had vanished

from the salons. But up until about 1950 or so, Nietzsche was a blank space in the American

academy. The novelist William Gass, for instance, in a recent review of Curtis Cate’s Nietzsche

biography in the August 2005 Harper’s, states that he did not read Nietzsche when he went to

college, which would have been in the late 1940s. After the Second World War, Nietzsche

received an academic boost from his role as a precursor of existentialism and by the serious

translations and studies undertaken by Walter Kaufmann and Francis Golffing. This Nietzsche was

less political than Mencken’s Nietzsche, far more refined (whereas the Mencken/London

Nietzsche was vigorous and working-class, the Kaufmann-era Nietzsche was more a cocktail-arty

phenomenon), and had its center of gravity pulled away from Thus Spake Zarathustra toward The

Birth of Tragedy. This was the era when “Apollonian” and “Dionysian” became household words,

at least in the household of the American intellectual. In a later generation, the use of Nietzsche

became more sophisticated and even more recondite, as Nietzsche’s demolishing of the idols was

troped as deconstruction, and his genealogy was taken up, in both letter and spirit, by Foucault.

Like many in my generation, I approached Nietzsche reading backward from de Man,

Derrida, and Foucault. This mirrored the experience of the previous generation which read

Nietzsche backward from Sartre and Camus. Everybody involved here, in both generations, saw

themselves in participating in a critique of the American status quo that was fundamentally Leftist

in approach. Meanwhile, Nietzsche became a respectable staple of American academia, flourishing

in German, philosophy, and (remembering the preeminence of The Birth of Tragedy in the era of

American academic expansion in the 1950s) Classics departments. As with most of US academia

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at the time, these professors certainly, for the most part, saw themselves on the Left. Although of

course, American neo-Nazis no doubt misappropriated Nietzsche the same way as their originals

had in Germany, this was not an interpretive strain native to American thought.

The point of summarizing all this well-known material is merely to show that Nietzsche in

America (as opposed to say, ‘Hegel in America’ which was part of the philosophical establishment

in the late nineteenth century, even if not the dominant strain) has always been a pursuit engaged

in largely on the American left. But there is one important exception to this, and it lies not on the

Nazi fringe, but on the democratic Right. This exception--and ‘exception’, in the Carl Schmittian

sense, will indeed prove to be an important attribute of our explication of this situation--revolves

around one term of Nietzsche’s: ressentiment. A search of the digital archives of Commentary

magazine reveals 24 instances of ressentiment, surely unequaled by citations of eternal recurrence,

Zarathustra, the transvaluation of values, the will to power, or amor fati. Why is the idea of

ressentiment so prominent in the discourse of intellectuals who otherwise would see Nietzsche as

half-madman, half-malevolent genius, but in no wise a moral guide?

Nietzsche introduces ressentiment in On The Genealogy of Morals, when he is contrasting

the (historically situated, though not actually historical) replacement of the dichotomy of ‘good

and bad’ with that of ‘good and evil.’ In the Homeric aristocracy and similar tribal oligarchies,

Nietzsche says, there were simply the well-born and the base, and only what we would today call

class distinctions, not moral ones between good and its obverse. The bureaucratization of

organized religion in the Mediterranean world, Nietzsche says, had a leveling effect. With its ideas

of sin and guilt internalizing the physical struggle for existence, the priestly class operated as a

kind of disciplinary intellectual cadre. “He has to defend his herd, but against whom? Against the

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healthy people undoubtedly, but also against their envy of the healthy. He has to be the natural

opponent and critic of all rough, stormy, unchecked, hard, violent, predatory health and power.

The priest is the first form of the more refined animal which despises more easily than it hates. He

will not be spared having to conduct wars with predatory animals, wars of cunning (of the ‘spirit’)

rather than of force, as is obvious” (GM, III, 15). This substitution of despising for hatred, the

replacement of straightforward antagonism with insidious envy, is the characteristic mode of what

Nietzsche terms ressentiment.

Before we get to the history of the concept of ressentiment, we should look at the word

itself. Why, when we are discussing a German philosopher in English, do we use a French word?

All ressentiment means in French is resentment. If a French person had heard the word used, all

they would have understood is the garden-variety connotation of ‘resentment’ in English. It has

no original idiomatic meaning in French. Nietzsche was using ressentiment in a particular manner

that, once he used it, was bound to become a term of art in later intellectual formulations; when

Max Scheler wrote about ressentiment in 1912. He was using it in this designated, Nietzschean

sense, as, to use Scheler’s own phrase (39) a “terminus technicus.” But it is a mistake to think

that when Nietzsche originally used ressentiment he was using a word insulated from ordinary

German conversation. Although German has words of its own roughly equivalent to ‘resentment’,

such as groll (most literally translated as ‘rancor,” see Scheler 39) and verstimmung, even before

Nietzsche’s time ressentiment was the word most Germans would use when they wanted to

express this concept. Borrowed during the Enlightenment vogue for all things French (and, as

Walter Kaufmann points out, Nietzsche’s reaching for the French word can be seen as an instance

of his aspiration to be a “Good European”, a deliberate repudiation of Hegel’s nationalistic

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attempt to ‘Germanize’ the philosophical lexicon), the word would not necessarily have been

spoken by the man in the street. But it was part of the general diction of the educated, cultured

German, who, when they said it, reached for it with no strain, no affect.

Perhaps the word ‘genre’ in English is roughly comparable; ‘genre’ is of French origin, but it is

also an English word, although again one not spoken by the man on the street; to the educated

person, a ‘genre’ expresses something more particular than a ‘kind’ of something. The problem is,

in English the word, ressentiment, always italicized, is not natural the way ‘genre’ is. As Robert

Solomon says (118) it sounds more sarcastic en français. We have our own word, ‘resentment,’

and the very closeness of the French word to ours indicates that the Nietzschean use must be

something special, something different. Whereas in German (and for that matter French)

Nietzsche’s word is the same word used ordinarily, albeit with a special use, in a special

‘language-game,’ in English it is a downright exotic word used only within in Nietzschean

context. Some other factors intrude here: French words are most often learned borrowings

accessible to the intellectual elite, so the Frenchness of ressentiment rarefies it, makes it part of

elevated parlance. “The German word has . . . the connotations of a word of foreign origin,”

(128) says Rudiger Bittner. Thus it risks sounding pretentious by using a French word which has

so obvious an English equivalent. Or perhaps, since nearly all of the people who would use

ressentiment in English are intellectuals, and ressentiment, as a concept, implies that intellectuals

are ill-motivated and have erected their systems as a revenge against the naturally strong, as a

kind of trahison des clercs, an overtone of resentment creeps into the enunciation of ressentiment

because the intellectuals who use it are, inferentially, admitting, or appearing to admit, that they

are up to something dirty. In even mentioning the word ressentiment, intellectuals are exposing

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their own false consciousness. Also, perhaps there is an unease about not pronouncing the word

correctly, especially as it is so easy to leave out the extra syllable. Thus, even in the epiphenomena

of ressentiment, resentment proliferates.

Though most intellectuals who use the word ressentiment are conscious in the first instance of

its Nietzschean origins, it is Max Scheler who really popularized the term in a sociological sense.

Scheler (1874-1928) is an unusual figure, somebody with a world reputation, but somebody who

was judged as recently as 1967 by a sympathetic biographer, John Raphael Staude, to be a

comparative failure (Staude 253). Scheler passed through a series of intellectual phases, from

Catholicism (to which he converted at fourteen) to agnosticism, from an adamant support of

Kaiser Wilhelm to a begrudging acceptance of the Weimar Republic. (Staude says [257], with

reluctant candor, that, though the principles of Scheler’s thought were ethically opposed to those

of Nazism, Scheler’s tendency to trim his intellectual sails according to which side was winning

would have made him vulnerable to supporting Nazism if he had lived to see it come into power).

Scheler is seen as contributing to fields as varied as phenomenology and sociology of knowledge,

and was a great intellectual inspiration to the late Pope John Paul II. Scheler’s monograph on

ressentiment is an early book, and, for all its fame, lacks the intellectual depth and technical

sophistication of his fuller treatises such as The Nature of Sympathy and Formalism in Ethics.

Some of what Scheler talks about as ressentiment seems more like garden-variety resentment.

For instance, he mentions a mother-in-law’s resentment of her daughter-in-law not only for

stealing her son but for being a younger, prettier woman. This not only seems rather gendered for

our own day but too trivial and mundane in apposition to Nietzsche’s far more abstract and urgent

rehearsal of the term. If the mother-in-law, who Scheler terms “a tragic rather than ridiculous

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figure” (64) generalizes her resentment of the younger woman into a critique of youthful

hegemony, and then, rather than contesting it, assumed a posture of scornful superiority toward it,

that would indeed be ressentiment in the Nietzschean sense. But all Scheler seems to be pointing

to is a kind of backbiting.

Similarly, Scheler mentions the case of e.g. a former President now out of office who resents

the fact he no longer has the power held by his successors. Scheler’s primary reader would think

only of Otto von Bismarck, and Scheler indeed says,“The ‘retired official’ with his followers is a

typical ressentiment figure” (64). But Scheler ignores the more complex factors at work here.

Bismarck certainly resented that he was out of power and that Caprivi and later Hohenlohe were

in power, but surely Caprivi and Hohenlohe also felt resentment that their reputations would

never be as great as Bismarck, that they were known and ridiculed as hand-picked men of the new

Kaiser who could not stand competition from Bismarck, and that they did not command the ear of

Europe the way that Bismarck did. In fact, Bismarck’s successors were no doubt more jealous of

him than vice versa. This entire example incidentally, posits ressentiment as quite a modern

phenomenon indeed, because it is no relatively recently that there were such a thing as ex-heads of

government. Diocletian aside, Roman history proffers no Emperors Emeriti; Galba was not

around to kibitz about Otho from the back seat of the chariot, simply because society was not

stable enough to accommodate both power-holders and those who formerly held power. In both

the mother-in-law and ex-President examples, Scheler’s sense of motivation seems impoverished

compared to what a novelist or dramatist of any distinction would do with these situations.

Scheler seems to assume a rather petty level of mentality, that of the homme moyen sensuel, and

leave it at that. Both of these examples show Scheler retreating from Nietzsche’s bracketing of

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the term ressentiment to include long-term cultural patterns, not individual instances of

resentment. Surely the resentment you feel towards, say, the person who replaces you in your job

or runs off with your spouse is not of the same order as the ressentiment that Nietzsche says the

weak, as a class, feel against the strong, as a class?

One understands the popularity of Scheler’s book among sociologists, since sociologists,

unlike literary critics, are laudably undistressed by individual lapses, or even the fundamental

inauthenticity of the basic premise of a work, if they can use it in formulating a methodological

frame. One also understands the value of Scheler’s other writings to phenomenologists and

philosophers of religion. Nonetheless, Scheler’s Ressentiment is a bit of a letdown to actually

read. It is a monographic polemic, and there is an element of occasional writing, almost of

journalistic commentary, to it. Nietzsche’s very outlandishness insulated On The Genealogy of

Morals from seeming like an Op-Ed piece, which is what Scheler’s work often resembles: an

informed, thoughtful commentary by a prominent public intellectual on the editorial page of a

center-right newspaper. Witness Scheler’s offhand remark that “The dictum of Wilhelm II about

the ‘social ministers’ is extremely pertinent and striking” (133), or, even more hilariously, in a

footnote, “Our present-day semi-parliamentarism the German Empire is conducive to the inner

health of the people...” (177). Even if we bracket whatever our own feelings are towards Wilhelm

II, even if he had made a seemingly kind remark about the Weimar Republic (as he was later, if

with notably lesser enthusiasm, to do in the 1920s) this sort of specificity, lacking both

Nietzsche’s wide vision and gestural brio, demonstrates the limits of Scheler’s mode of analysis,

its tendency towards the journalistic and prudential. This prudential quality constrains what M. J

Bowles, in “The Practice of Meaning in Nietzsche and Wittgenstein” (14-15) says of the creative

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possibilities of ressentiment: “Far from indicating the collapse of life, ressentiment in fact marks

the potentiality of a tremendous energy source. The question, alas, has always been, not how can

we save the mouse from running round and round on its treadmill, but how can we harness this

raw source of energy? What can we build with it?” It is not just, as Scheler seems to think,

something that is ‘wrong’ with society, something that can potentially be, in the medium-term at

least, cured. Scheler’s diagnosis only pertains to ‘current’ circumstances, with little long-range applicability.

Nietzsche’s ressentiment is not resentment, but resentment that has become internalized, in

which the weak have rationalized their own weakness by inversely privileging it as morally

superior to the strong. There is still resentment in the petty sense, but it is systematized in an

(inverse) transvaluation of values. On The Genealogy of Morals, though written in the 1880s, was

distinctly not just a tract of those times.

Scheler’s book falls into two parts: a preliminary, and, as I have said, at times trivial

accounting of resentment in ordinary society, and then an impassioned argument refuting

Nietzsche’s assertion that Christian love was an expression of ressentiment. Scheler opposes

ancient Greek love, which, as in Platonic love, moves from the lower to the higher, to Christian

love. The Christian acts in the “peculiarly pious conviction that through this ‘condescension,’

through this self-abasement and “self-renunciation; he gains the highest good and becomes equal

to God.” The change in the notion of God and his fundamental relation to man and the world is

not “ the cause, but the consequence of this reversal in the movement of love” (86) Scheler sees

Christian love as being a kind of noblesse oblige, a shining of the light of surplus happiness from

the saved to the unsaved. This may be true of the love of Christ himself--the doctrine of kenosis

expounded by St. Paul in his Epistle to the Philippians, and commented on so thoughtfully in the

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twentieth century by Romano Guardini, where Christ empties out his own divinity in order to save

mankind.

But it is more arguable whether, in Christian terms, it is wise to say that this kind of love ,

what Scheler calls “sacrifice for the weaker, the sick, and the small” springs from “inner sanctity

and vital plenitude” (90). For the Christian, Christ, as God, certainly has these attributes. But the

believing Christian human being does not, qua Christian human being, have them. The

condescension of the naturally strong towards the unfortunately weak sounds overweening when

it is cited as the source of Christian love by Christian human beings to other humans. Surely the

starting point for that kind of love is our sense of our own inadequacy and smallness. As opposed

to Scheler’s immediate analysis, when Nietzsche singles out (his) contemporary anarchists and

anti-Semites as nodes of ressentiment, he means anarchism and anti-Semitism as practiced

throughout the nineteenth century, not just in the 1880s. Nietzsche’s scope of the present is, say,

a century long, whereas Scheler’s is a decade. Thus Nietzsche’s critiques of the present are, in

themselves, more abstract than Scheler’s. Scheler sees Christian love as being akin to noblesse

oblige, a shining of the light of surplus happiness from the saved to the unsaved. Scheler seems

contemptuous of Jews (though half-Jewish himself), women, dwarfs, cripples, and Social

Democrats in a way that does not reassure us as to the catholicity of his concept of even the

Christian human being, much less those outside the fold who presumably we, unlike Scheler, do

not wish to consign to outer darkness. To impute Christian love overly to a God-given superiority

is not only to be religiously smug and to succumb to an elitism similar to, but more self-satisfied

than, Nietzsche’s. It is also more dangerous in that Nietzsche’s elitism was in important ways not

totally ‘real.’ Nietzsche did not think there were people out in the world who actually constituted

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such a potential elite in his terms. Whereas Scheler, thinking of Christians, surely thought that

there were such people: that white, male Christians of ‘normal’ height were an elite that, if it did

not actually exist, could be reanimated with a bit of a spark from Scheler’s own genius.

Though Scheler may at time see fragility in some humans (and I am using the word ‘fragility’

in explicitly the terms in which it has been used by Martha C. Nussbaum), he does not allow that

glimpse to extend to his own self-reckoning. He makes statements that condescend to people

unlike himself while imputing to himself a level of supreme cognitive authority, such as his

prediction that “the representative feminine groups” (62) of the Anglo-American countries will be

increasingly recruited...from those individuals who lack specifically feminine charms.” (62) Not

only did this not foresee such twenty-first century phenomena as Jessica Simpson, it is so specific

a prognosis as to be fundamentally crank. Scheler, like Nietzsche, can come forth with statements

that, in objective terms, sound preposterous. But Scheler’s pronouncements are more vexatious

because, unlike Nietzsche, he so clearly intended to be pragmatic and responsible.

Scheler takes the sense of self-aware disempowerment–of seeing power up close but not being

remotely able to attain it--felt in Wilhelmine Germany by bourgeois people, socialists, Jews,

women, and even dwarfs, all of whom at Scheler rather gratuitously mentions, and hypostatize it

into an assumption about how all disempowered people feel under any conditions. Sociologists

who accept Scheler’s account of ressentiment as adequate to any somewhat democratic society

tout court risks misunderstanding how burdened Scheler’s account is by its Wilhelmine origins

(Scheler would no doubt have written differently even ten years later in the Weimar Republic).

They also risk saddling the disempowered, with all their other problems, with problems that are

not in fact theirs, but are ascribed to them by sardonic, aristocracy-flattering intellectuals.

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This is not merely a problem endemic to Scheler. Contemporary writers who speak of

ressentiment also find themselves involved in such a position, of seeing the avatars of

ressentiment as specific, current practices. Marion Tapper, for instance, cogently espies instances

of ressentiment in a prevalent feminist climate of opinion at Australian universities, where, even if

feminists do not have the formal power, women feminist academics exercise a kind of informal

hegemony over discussion, lording it over men, and exulting that they are lording it over men in

the way men once lorded it over them. (Tepper does not mention Scheler's association of women

with ressentiment). This may be true (my own experience of Australian universities is not quite

that) but it strikes one as a very specific critique. If ressentiment is so localized it is easily dealt

with by easily implemented local reforms, hardly befitting a deep-structural problem. For all the

wildness of Nietzsche's sighting of ressentiment in priestly Christianity, it does have the virtue of

assigning to it not just one current practice but an entire way of thought, what Foucault might

have termed an episteme, and casts ressentiment as more of a fundamental malady and less of a

minor, if chronic, illness. Scheler’s exemption of Christian love from ressentiment is non-

Nietzschean, in the sense that Nietzsche would not have agreed with it–in fact Nietzsche saw

Christian love as the essence of ressentiment. But Scheler’s rescue-job is not un-Nietzschean, in

that this kind of broad stroke is the sort of performance in which Nietzsche delighted. What

Nietzsche would not have delighted in is the prudential, pedestrian metier of so much of Scheler’s

exposition

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Scheler took a complicated, playfully enunciated concept and made it into something

determinate, a term which was used by social commentators with a degree of confidence as to

what it was they were discussing. Though it is risky to extrapolate what Nietzsche’s views would

have been on the history that happened after his death, one can hazard a guess not about

Nietzsche himself but about those who apply the term ressentiment. Given that both Nietzsche

and Scheler posit the French Revolution as a primal instance of ressentiment, it appears that the

term especially applied to sudden swerves to the Left in national politics. What is the twentieth

century equivalent? Is it the Russian Revolution? This really cannot be, as there were obvious

ways to criticize Soviet totalitarianism without resorting to concepts as arcane as ressentiment.

What those who resist social equality mean by ressentiment is what, in their view, ensued after the

Left came to power democratically. Although an analogy can be made to the American New Deal,

surely the chief ressentiment-enabling event was the election of Clement Attlee’s Labour Party in

the England of 1945. Though Attlee’s was a mildly Leftist government which was heartily anti-

Communist, somebody like Scheler would have regretted his ascension, denouncing as he did “all

kinds of ‘socialism,’ ‘social feeling’, ‘altruism’, and other subaltern modern things” (Scheler 93).

The assumption that in Attlee’s England a more egalitarian social style would be adopted meant,

for many who resisted social equality, the death-knell of a worthwhile society. The point is that

Attlee’s victory was not just considered a will o’ the wisp, but a permanent change in who

governed society. The masses were deemed, at least on a political level, to have gained parity with

their quondam betters, whether people liked it or not. In 1975, a Labour government was in

power in Britain; and, even if there had been many years of Conservative government in-between,

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the fundamental assumptions of 1945-era Labour still reigned prevalent. Similarly, in Nietzsche’s

and Scheler’s own Germany, the Social Democratic Party was not only in power, but was

considered the natural party of government-- even if this had been a relatively recent

phenomenon, it was seen as running with the tide of history, not against it. It was also in the

1970s that ressentiment became a byword employed by American neoconservative intellectuals.

An example plucked virtually at random occurs in Stephen Miller’s review of Peter Clecak’s book

Crooked Paths; Reflections on Socialism, Conservatism and the Welfare State, published in the

March 1977 issue of Commentary. Miller accuses Clecak of having an “animus against the

marketplace”(95) and that his too-egalitarian world-view would “enormously increase the

ressentiment of the country’s citizens, placing constitutional democracy under a well-nigh

intolerable burden” (96). The use of ressentiment here is Schelerian, not Nietzschean, and it is tied

to a particular dissent from what was then seen as the post-World War II egalitarian consensus.

One would not want to risk repeating Scheler’s mistake by binding the reaction against

ressentiment to a local political agenda, but, even if the issues in the minds of people who used

the term were more abstract, this was the political backdrop against which that abstraction arose.

If ressentiment was the problem of a leveling modern liberalism, “counter-ressentiment” or

“counter-modernity” is the problem of a postmodern neoconservatism which seeks once again to

divide our society into winners and losers, into the conquerors and the conquered. Counter-

modernity attempts to reverse the social equality associated with the very concept of modernity,

as Nietzsche and his contemporaries would have understood the term and as it was later refined

by Weber, Durkheim, and, eventually, Hans Blumenberg. One wonders what Nietzsche would

make of this. I cannot think he would be straightforwardly on its side, or a proponent of it; in

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other words, he would recognize it as ressentiment, and not be deceived by its putatively anti-

ressentiment rhetoric. But would he see it as simply the old ressentiment, with “a different

fragrance” (GM, II, 10) or would it be a qualitatively new phenomenon? Did Nietzsche see

modernity, good or bad, as running in one direction? Could he have conceived of the

contemporary Right’s project of a counter-modernity so vast and so systematic as to possess, or

appropriate, the force of a modernity that most thinkers, whatever their vantage point, had seen,

since at least the Renaissance, as irrevocable?

Admittedly, one of the reasons counter-modernity has so shockingly seized the initiative from

modernity is because modernity aspired to what Walter Benjamin called “homogeneous, empty

time,” the obliteration of specificity and idiosyncrasy, and manifested an arrogant confidence in its

homogenizing sweep. This was one of the aspects of modernity which the ‘Dionysian’ Nietzsche

of the 1950s protested against; if the Dionysian had been able to be more satisfactorily integrated

into modernity in the 1960s, perhaps the reaction against modernity would not have been quite so

virulent and so powerful. Even earlier, the debunking, working-class Nietzsche of Mencken and

London were trying to use Nietzsche to achieve a kind of modernity in which man was not

reduced to an automaton whose only function was to mouth standardized cliches and repeat the

slogans of the people running the social order. So pointing out the problematic assumptions of

counter-modernity does not imply a blanket endorsement of modernity.

But an important point remains to be made about the homogenizing sweep of modernity.

This sweep constituted Nietzsche’s ‘horizon of expectations’. Nietzsche was prophetic in many

ways, but not even the most clairvoyant individual can foresee the specific instances of what T. S.

Eliot called history’s ‘cunning passages, contrived corridors.” So extrapolation of what Nietzsche

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would think of our world a century after his death is difficult. Nietzsche describes a “ruling

instinct and contemporary taste, in which would rather go along with the absolute contingency,

even the mechanical meaninglessness of all events rather than with the theory of a will to power

playing itself out in everything that happens” (GM II 12). Nietzsche bitterly complains about this

meaningless, this plebeian conformity, yet it was, in Nietzsche’s own enunciation, a horizon of his

world. What if that horizon was burst or repudiated by a counter-modernity? Would this be

Nietzsche’s dream-come-true, or an unutterable nightmare? Nietzsche liked, as it were, to kvetch

about modernity. Indeed, he protested against its fundamental assumptions, in strong and eloquent

terms. But did he want to disestablish it? Just as Nietzsche lashes against the post-Kantian

transcendentalists for thinking they had at all ‘advanced’ when they went beyond God, saying

“They’ve become emancipated from the theologians. What a stroke of luck!” (GM, III, 25), so

might he have said of the counter-modern right, “So, they have become emancipated from

leveling social equality. What a stroke of luck!” Might his reaction to a triumphalist counter-

modernity have been like this (GM II, 24): “How high a price has been paid on earth for the

construction of every ideal? How much reality had to be constantly vilified and misunderstood,

how many lies had to be consecrated, how many consciences corrupted, how much "god" had to

be sacrificed every time? That is the law—show me the case where it has not been fulfilled!”

Nietzsche said that, in his time, ressentiment flourishes particularly among “anarchists and

anti-Semites.” (GM, II, 10) Despite not being one of their number, however, he did not mention

the democratic socialists in Germany as the fount of ressentiment, seeing the Social Democrats as

people “whose criticism is absolute and uninhibited, precisely because they count on never being

ministers.” (51) But Scheler seems to lean much more in this direction, and by the time we reach

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1945 and the viability of social-democratic parties in the Western World, most on the Right who

spoke of ressentiment had attacked social democracy and its imputed tendency to level people, to

suppress what T. S. Eliot might call ‘the individual talent.’ Like Nietzsche, the reaction against

ressentiment assumed that the individual, rather than the herd mentality (what Nietzsche calls “the

organization of a herd,” GM, III, 18) , accounted for all that was truly noble and good in the

human spirit. This sentiment echoed what Nietzsche said: "They are all men of ressentiment,

physiologically unfortunate and worm-eaten, a whole tremulous realm of subterranean revenge,

inexhaustible and insatiable in outbursts against the fortunate and happy and in masquerades of

revenge and pretexts for revenge" (GM III: 14). Unlike Nietzsche, though, the counter-

ressentiment party had specific remedies to oust ressentiment and its hegemony; simply by putting

the rise of ressentiment so recently back in time, they did not see it as an endemic part of being as

Nietzsche did. Basically, if one sees ressentiment as able to be transcended, to be ‘squared’ away,

the time of ressentiment’s ascension is placed relatively recently, if not 1945 than at least (as

Scheler seems to do) the French Revolution or a with a seventeenth-century ‘dissociation of

sensibility.’ If you, as Nietzsche largely does, put the time of ressentiment’s ascension two

thousand years ago you are, in all practical terms, suggesting that there is little one could do about

it without bursting society’s bounds in an apocalyptic way. The post-1945 counter-ressentiment

Right saw the society around them as interchangeable clods manufactured to fit into a system

regulated by the need for social equality, and repressing individual initiative, individual genius.

It is in protest against this sort of equality-mandated mediocre leveling, what C. G. Jung, in a

slightly different context, called an abaissement de niveau mental, that calls for the unfettering of

the individual such as Ayn Rand’s were raised, though Randians apparently do not much use the

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term ressentiment. It comes up in their discourse, but nearly always credited to Nietzsche, and

does not seem to have taken on indigenous Randian life. Perhaps Nietzsche, for all his

individualism, is concerned with the health and good of a society in a way that Rand is not, even if

Nietzsche’s society is hardly the stolid, conformist, modernized Gemeinschaft, to invoke

Tonnies’s famous dichotomy, that most mentions of ‘society’ in a classical sociological context

evoke. As Rebecca Stringer points out, “ressentiment pertains to reactive feelings repeatedly felt

and designates a psychological state that is always and only relational...” (264). Ressentiment, in

many ways, is not just in the way we breathe. It is the air we breathe, and thus its diagnosis

presumes some sort of social solidarity. Nietzsche has been called an antidemocratic individualist,

but his sense of individualism is not atomized the way Rand’s is, nor does it have the strange

conformism that Rand’s does. For Rand, every individual is different in a similar way, whereas

Nietzsche’s emphasis on play and gestural style means that every individual is potentially as

different from most others as Nietzsche himself was different from most other people.

Nietzsche also, and this is not something we have been taught to expect from him, is far more

compassionate towards those who do not, fundamentally, fit into his vision of the world than

those who favor a resurgent counter-modernity. Nietzsche is adamantly opposed to a retributive

morality based on punishment. His elevation of “good versus bad” over “good versus evil” is not

a “back to basics” call to be “tough on crime.” Nietzsche is opposed to the Biblical lex talionis,

eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and is interested in less insistent and more ramified modes of

articulating justice. And Nietzsche, despite various interpretations to the contrary, did not want

‘ordinary people’ to be mistreated. Witness the courteous, almost diplomatic language here:

“There are indeed a sufficient number of good and modest working people among scholars

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nowadays, people happy in their little corners. For this reason: because their work satisfies them,

from time to time, with some presumption, they make noises demanding that people today should

in general be happy, particularly with scientific knowledge. There are so many useful things to do.

I don't deny that. The last thing I want to do is to ruin the pleasure these honest laborers take in

their handiwork. For I'm happy about their work. But the fact that people are working rigorously

in science these days and that there are satisfied workers is simply no proof that science today, as

a totality, has a goal, a will, an ideal, a passion in a great faith. As I've said, the opposite is the

case.” (GM, III, 23). Nietzsche feels the ‘good and modest working people” may be in the most

basic sense living a lie, but he does not begrudge them the pleasure they get in their work. He is,

in other words, not being spiteful, even against a system he thinks is ultimately based on

spitefulness, on its repression into a rhetoric of social harmony and scientific optimism.

Nietzsche’s protest against modernity has often been simplified into a championship of

power-hungry alpha animals over less aggressive, acquiescent souls. Yet Nietzsche says he has

found “strength where one would not look for it: in simple, mild, and pleasant people, without the

least desire to rule - and, conversely, the desire to rule has often appeared to me a sign of inward

weakness: they fear their own slavish soul and shroud it in a royal cloak (in the end, they still

become the slaves of their followers, their fame, etc.). The powerful natures dominate, it is a

necessity, they need not lift one finger. Even if, during their lifetime, they bury themselves in a

garden house (Nachlass, fall 1880, 6 [206]).

In other words, power in Nietzsche can be exercised through passivity, withdrawal, restraint.

There is even what one might call a Gandhian cast to it. This calm, reposed confidence sounds a

note absent from stereotypical representations of Nietzsche. We are apt to think of Nietzsche as a

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frenetic, belligerent aphorist. In many ways, Nietzsche means for us to think him so, witness his

subtitling of On The Genealogy of Morals as (in Kaufmann’s translation) “An Attack.” But this

passage is full of nuance, qualification, and genuine tolerance. And it is these qualities that are so

lacking in those who seek to oust the regime of ressentiment and replace it with an era of renewed

individual initiative. The contemporary Right, for instance, finds itself unsatiated with how strong it

now is and how weak the left is; it has to grind the left's nose in the follies of its past. The discourse

surrounding the War on Terror, for instance, has brought up Soviet Communism again and again. If

this were just to assert a kind of genealogy of absolutist political thought from Nazism to

Communism to Islamist extremism, this is not dishonorable. But the enormous space given to

Communism in contemporary Rightist writing on terrorism indicates a vindictiveness, a desire to

really let the Left have it for putting its trust in a Soviet ideology that a) was immoral and that b)

lost. This is one of the most salient examples of counter-ressentiment on the Right. Soviet

communism, or at least its rhetoric, is the embodiment of what Nietzsche would have seen as

ressentiment. But the ressentiment of its enemies concerning it neither heals nor trumps it, but

exacerbates the original ressentiment. With regard to Islamism, the quondam enemies of

Communism (or, more accurately, those who in the twenty-first century retroactively assume this

mantle) are in the position of outward happiness and inward agony, that Nietzsche describes so

well in Genealogy I 12: “We come back again and again into the light, we live over and over our

golden hour of victory—and then we stand there, just as we were born, unbreakable, tense, ready

for something new, for something even more difficult, more distant, like a bow which all trouble

only serves to pull more tight.” The golden hour of triumph over Communism must be brought

back again and again in a trite, vengeful spirit even in the midst of the proclaimed menace of

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Islamism.

Put algebraically, is the ressentiment of ressentiment like multiplying a negative number by itself,

thus producing a positive? Or is it like multiplying a negative number by a positive, thus

exacerbating, supersizing the negativity? Does the conjuring of ressentiment against ressentiment

cure the entire malady by doubling privation? Or must some element of lack remain?

III

I want now to read three works of literature written at three different ages: one in which social

equality was deemed impractical, another where social equality was deemed to have advanced so far

that it was the default mode of the society, and a third in which social equality is once again

rendered vulnerable as some people are once again thought inherently better than others. This

exercise will show how ressentiment would have operated in the era before Nietzsche, how it

operated in the future as clairvoyantly glimpsed by Nietzsche, and how a systematic ressentiment

operates in an era, that, hopefully, he did not foresee in his worst nightmares.

The name ‘Malvolio’ borne by the deluded and overweening servant in Shakespeare’s Twelfth

Night means ‘bad will’, and it is easy to see how Shakespeare fashions Malvolio as a living

excrescence of malicious volition run amok. As Duncan Large points out, Nietzsche had a great

love of Shakespeare. So it is appropriate that for our most obvious demonstration of how

ressentiment might appear in literature we go to a popular Shakespeare play, though not one that

seems to have been especially mentioned by Nietzsche. Twelfth Night, beneath its ostensible

concern with the pair of amorous couples that makes up its foregrounded plot, features Malvolio:

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the ill-tempered (the name is virtually allegorical), overweening, ambitious, and above all humorless

servant who gets above himself. He is able to be tricked into thinking that the aristocratic Olivia is

in love with him because his conception of himself is that he is able to attain such heights (in a

social, not in a romantic sense):

Why, every thing

adheres together, that no dram of a scruple, no

scruple of a scruple, no obstacle, no incredulous

or unsafe circumstance--What can be said? Nothing

that can be can come between me and the full

prospect of my hopes. Well, Jove, not I, is the

doer of this, and he is to be thanked. (Twelfth Night, act 3, scene iv, ll. 85-90)

As Marjorie Garber amusingly comments, Malvolio is “the Cincinnatus of the pantry” (Garber

528), cloaking his desire to climb socially in the vestments of social responsibiltiy and duty.

Malvolio’s giving credit, in the speech quoted above, to Jove and not himself is just the sort of

complacent abdication of personal responsibility Nietzsche sees as typical of ressentiment. The

combination of thinking that he deserves better than his fate, that the tide of history is somehow

conspiring to bring him these better desserts, and that the gods are behind this is just the sort of

managerial complacency that Nietzsche sees fomented and disseminated by the middle-to-late-

antique priestly class. The audience is aware of the dramatic irony that Malvolio is in no way going

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to get what he thinks he deserves; he is hung out to dry in front of us in advance, so to speak,

making his aspirations more grotesque, more appalling. But although Malvolio is a servant

attempting to join the ranks of the masters, class is not the only issue here. It is Malvolio’s pompous

self-importance, his officiousness, his treatment of what he thinks of as his own good fortune as

something to be objectively vaunted, that makes the viewer mock him and recoil from him. As

dramatic convention makes inevitable, Malvolio is foiled as part of the comic restoration at the end.

Although Feste, the clown, who is an active agent in the tricking and foiling of Malvolio, is also in a

way the ‘voice’ of the play, singing the envoi to the audience at the end, one does not feel Feste has

a separate ideology of his own. In other words, Malvolio’s defeat restores, and is able to restore,

the status quo ante. Feste, on the other hand, does not have an independent ‘counter-ressentiment’

ideology that comes conceptually after rather than before the challenge to the status quo ante. . But

Shakespeare is not just squelching the impudent servant in the way of Roman comedy in the hands

of Plautus or Terence. Malvolio is seen as representing an incipient political tendency that can gain

assent in an ideological sense, rather than a generally social sense. Shakespearean society cannot

implement Malvolio’s desired rise. That would imply a leveling of what one of Shakespeare’s

characters elsewhere calls ‘degree’. But Malvolio is just plausible as a potential power-wielder in

Twelfth Night In other words, Shakespeare’s political world may just be at the edge of a classical

conception of paideia, where social stability is in a way encrypted into society’s conception of

itself, and towards a modern political world where allegiance and identity are far less bound. (I take

this basic distinction from the work of Paul Rahe, although Rahe places it later, in the eighteenth

century). This hint in the play is heightened by the fact that Malvolio, in his sobriety and repression

associated with Puritanism, can be seen as a premonition of the Puritanism that was to conquer

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English society during the Civil War just a half-century later. Jeanette Winterson’s historical novel

Sexing The Cherry (1991) makes just this point; that Cromwell’s England was filled with

ressentiment which inhibited creativity (Nietzsche says much the same about the Reformation with

respect to the Renaissance), and that the explorer Tradescant, who discovered exotic food and even

more exotic sex, was in a way a redress for this.

Malvolio has in fact been read as representing Puritanism:

Have ye

no wit, manners, nor honesty, but to gabble like

tinkers at this time of night? Do ye make an

alehouse of my lady's house, that ye squeak out your

coziers' catches without any mitigation or remorse

of voice? Is there no respect of place, persons, nor

time in you? (Twelfth Night, act II, scene iii, 42-46).

In this way, the triumph of the clowns and scapegraces over their dour would-be superior foils

the emergence of a mentality in which Malvolio, invoking the authority of his imagined love, Olivia,

conjures a world where such Dionysian indulgences as the drinking of ale would be prevented.

Ironically, Malvolio, who is trying to ascend in the social hierarchy, no sooner thinks he has

ascended to power than he immediately invokes a sense of order and degree under which he himself

was previously limited. New presbyter, as Milton would have said, is but old priest writ large. This

leads the historically-minded reader to wonder if, despite his defeat within the play, Malvolioism did

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not triumph, at least for a time, in the 1640s and 1650s. If Nietzsche saw the French Revolution as

an outgrowth of ressentiment, he surely would have seen the English Revolution as such, especially

given its manifestly Christian overtones quite at odds with the French Revolution’s militant atheism.

(Interestingly, however, despite Nietzsche’s detestation of the priesthood, these modern,

ressentiment-fed revolutions were both very anticlerical).

But if Malvolio anticipates Cromwell, and is put down for it, there is no articulated philosophy

of counter-revolution doing the putting-down. There are the squelchers of Malvolio, there are those

who delight in his humiliation, but there is no counter-Malvolioism, and the society of Twelfth Night

is set right in a way that may conveniently restore the old class boundaries but also contains the

political energies launched by Malvolio’s quest for power within the constraints of a stable order in

which Malvolio’s opponents do not, in taking their revenge, themselves become a political party

with a novel, hegemonic ideology.

Let us now look at another fictional landscape, one where the boundary between master and

servant is far less tidy. John L’Heureux’s short story “Brief Lives in California” (1980) is set at

Stanford University in the late 1970s. The protagonist of L’Heureux’s story, Leonora, is an

eighteen year-old young woman in her first year of college. Leonora is, very obviously, white and

most likely from a ‘non-ethnic’ background. Leonora has come from a striving, middle-class family

determined to give her the best in life. In high school, she performs academically in the way her

family and society expect. And she is rewarded with that great passing of the threshold in America’s

‘meritocratic’ society, admission to the highly selective Stanford University. But even at Stanford,

in fact especially at Stanford, Leonora finds there are barriers that seem invisible to many, but to her

are as solid as those against which Malvolio bumps his head. The admission office at Stanford is not

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enthused about Leonora, seeing her as a ‘floater’ who is not a real Stanford freshman but is

admitted because some of the ‘real’ Stanford students, the applicants seen by the admissions office

as the caliber of student they would most naturally accept, have chosen Yale instead. Of course,

Leonora does not know this; she thinks she is one of the chosen ones. To fully understand Leonora,

we have to take account of Carl Schmitt’s observation that sovereignty lies in the exception, and

Leonora thinks she is the exception, the exceptional student. Whereas Malvolio seeks to move up to

the next degree, Leonora is at sea in a society without ascribed degree, which instead has a more

mobile status system.

Once in college, she is humiliated by having to take freshman composition. The entire

dilemma of Leonora having to take Freshman Composition arises out of the crossing of two regnant

American educational doctrines of the past generation: the belief in the exceptional student and the

call for raising of standards. The call for standards means that every student has to be taught basic

skills, so that no child is left behind. But this scrapes against the rather Randian, libertarian doctrine

of excellence, by which students who do well in school are made to feel entitled and that are led to

believe that they can go through the curriculum at their own pace. I well remember being in

classrooms at more or less ‘prestige’ colleges in which freshmen composition was required; a

wounded sourness reigned in the air, as if a group of European aristocrats had been forced to work

as longshoremen for two semesters. When her professor, Lockhardt, gives her a C, she protests and

raises hell with the university administration all because she has been told all her life that she is

exceptional and Lockhardt, in a university filled with the exceptional, tells her that she isn’t. From

this point, Leonora’s life slopes steadily downward, and she eventually becomes violent and

disturbed, intent on revenge against Lockhardt. Importantly, her revenge is not just ad hominem,

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but sublimated into a general grievance against the system for having encouraged her to think she

was special; and then, in college, letting her down by telling her that she was ordinary. There are

two sides to Leonora’s situation. One is that her parents have pushed her and encouraged her

perhaps beyond her actual level of talent; the other is that, in a society where so many are

encouraged to be talented in the same way, there is an inevitable standardization, and a denial to

people of any right to be special.

Attainment of status in Leonora’s world is now topsy-turvy, and there is not the monolithic

measurement of degree that Malvolio possesses. In a way it is Leonora’s fault that she is not that

special; in another way it is not. L’Heureux interestingly juxtaposes Leonora’s story with the

Patricia Hearst kidnapping. Hearst, a teenage daughter of a wealthy newspaper proprietor, was

kidnaped by a terrorist group with whom she later cooperated.. Whereas in previous generations

Hearst would have been famous, if at all, for being wealthy and for being a part of ‘the system,’ in

the era of diffused ressentiment Hearst becomes far more famous through her involvement with a

purportedly rebellious group. (This is reminiscent of what Nietzsche said about the ressentiment of

anarchists.) The assumptions of who is in control that existed in Malvolio’s time have come apart.

In this instability, Leonora sees her chance for power. Yet, beneath the appearance of instability, she

fears that Lockhardt, the teacher, still holds the key to success. Leonora is evincing what Nietzsche

(GM III, 26) calls “the high falsetto of.....approval” of what the armchair academic does not have

but sees as somehow desirable. To put Leonora’s position in terms of the vita contemplativa-vita

activa dichotomy evoked by Nietzsche in the Genealogy, Leonora thinks that academic laurels can

be won merely by the ‘me generation’s’ version of the vita contemplativa, that is to say ‘being

herself’. Lockhardt seems a bit smug and indifferent, and we can perhaps sympathize with Leonora

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when she finds that his luck keeps going well, he writes best-selling novels and so on, while she gets

even more desperate. Lockhardt. at the end, can be described as a man living off the fat of the land

as both professor and novelist, with little direct stake or interest in his students’ lives.

Like Malvolio, Leonora has no power or fame, and she wants those things desperately. Leonora

conceptualizes her suburban origins as a starting-point which does not define her but is more a kind

of abyss into which, before her birth, she has fallen, and can serve as a proving-ground to mount a

‘return’ to the sort of elite sphere to which her soul, as she sees it, ‘naturally’ belongs. Her

unpromising suburban origins are thus transcended in a conceptualization of ressentiment squared

as an enactment of the phrase reculer pour mieux sauter, in other words, fall back in order to rise

again. (See Nietzsche’s description of the ascetic ideal as a “faute de mieux” in GM, III, 28).

Although Leonora does not have, either in her own person or her family history, a myth of elite

origin, her sense that she is‘naturally’ entitled not to be ‘average’ suggests that her dreamt-for

scourging of ressentiment has, in her mind, an ontologically destined pattern. She is meant to be

excellent, to burst the bounds of mediocrity; this is her destiny and when her life does not

immediately turn out that way it is as if she is denuded, shorn of all possible aspiration.

Leonora failed. But her very failure indicates many successes, people who have become what

she aspired to be. With the reemergence of free-market capitalism in the 1980s and the

predominance of what Robert H. Frank and Philip Cook term “the winner-take-all society”. In this

society, the winners have burst out of the constraining herd mentality ressentiment. The winners are

the unchained blond beasts; their lives are ones of merit, free to be fulfilled in a revived free-market

utopia. I wish to look at a novel that, as it were, chronicles the other side of the mirror, through an

abstract, fantastic prism that does not simply premise itself on an empirical, ‘realistic’ reading of the

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situation. The acclaimed British novelist Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005) is set in a world

much like ours, except that, from about 1945, human clones have been harvested to provide spare

body parts for people who are ill. Never Let Me Go is set among the students of Hailsham, an

institution that seems to an elite private school but is in fact a harvesting-ground for clones, where

they are given a humanistic education, yet are schooled in preparation first for caring for clones who

donate organs, then to donate organs themselves, where, after three donations, they “complete”, i.e.

die.

In addition to their schooling, they are psychologically prepared to donate organs. Unlike other

clones, who are maltreated and kept in subaltern conditions, these clones are, comparatively, treated

humanely and compassionately, and allowed, for a time, to aspire to the same kind of lives as

‘normal’ people. The same window opens for them that opens for Malvolio and Leonora: Malvolio

is given the hope he will leave the realm of servitude through what he thinks is Olivia’s love for him;

Leonora is given the hope that meritocratic college admissions will elevate her above the suburban

conformism of her parents; Kathy, the narrator of Never Let Me Go, and her friends, are, in their

early years, given the hope that they will have normal careers and live out their full adult lives. They

learn, though, what their eventual fate is, indeed they learn this too early for it to be suspenseful in

narrative terms (one of Ishiguro’s many ingenious maneuvers in the novel). Compared to Malvolio

and Leonora, though, Kathy shows far less resentment against the system, even though she has

much more to lose: Malvolio is humiliated and put back in a servile position; Leonora is expelled

from the academic elite and loses her sanity; but Kathy stands to lose her very life. Kathy comes to

a kind of acceptance and an embrace of the small, yet palpable, happiness she has had. This is not

the kind of passive acceptance that renounces worldly ambition in order to feel an elevated moral

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status, like (to use Nietzsche’s example) the priests who rationalized their own weakness into

doctrine of humility and acceptance, or (to use Scheler’s) the mother-in-law who despises her

daughter-in-law yet takes comfort in the younger woman’s inadequacies. Kathy’s stance is less akin

to ressentiment than to another Nietzschean dramatic posture that is as renunciatory, yet more

affirmative: amor fati. Ressentiment defines everything in terms of its opposite, and thereby erects a

privileging of weakness that it does not really believe: it would be strong if it could. Kathy affirms

her own life in such a way that her moral superiority to the people who have set up the system that

constrains her is not even argued; it is so obvious as to be obviated, as to be unutterable.

Malvolio’s world is that of the pre-democratic paideia, where there is a stable social order that

can rebuke and constrain him. Leonora’s world is that of modern democratic society, where people

live, and aspire, on a mass scale, so that even the ordinary person can grow up thinking they are

extraordinary, where ressentiment, far from being the trait of an unusually uppity servant, is in every

suburban home, much like the television set. What is the world of Never Let Me Go? Do we not, in

Hailsham, see the obverse, the other side of the mirror, of the world of counter-ressentiment, the

world where the tide of modernity has been reversed, the ‘successful’ are once again free to be

successful--a world where mediocrity is no longer rewarded, where winners can once again be

winners and losers can once again be losers? The students of Hailsham are encouraged to believe

that they are talented; an outside patron, Madame Marie-Claude, collects their art and displays it in

a gallery in order to prove that clones, too, have souls, even though in fact, she finds the clones

repugnant. The teachers at Hailsham do not even have the option; they are but cogs in a system

whose task is to ultimately give the Great No to all its charges.

Ishiguro leaves a trail of clues which leads to a possible interpretation of the novel as a refracted

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registering of counter-ressentiment. The art of Hailsham does not matter; the goods that are

brought to the school for sale are not valuable commodities, but junk; the ‘achievement’ of the

students of Hailsham is, in aesthetic terms, a zero-sum game, as since the art seems to be the object

of collection and connoisseurship, it is all a put-up job, in which the art only has semiotic and not

aesthetic value. As Philip Pothen’s recent book Nietzsche and the Fate of Art indicates, Nietzsche

was himself skeptical that appreciation of the individual artwork can become a basis for ‘the

artistic’. The fundamental insincerity of the interest shown by the adults in the work of the Hailsham

students is an indication how percipient Nietzsche may have been. The art of Hailsham does not

matter. But, nonetheless, the claims of Hailsham to be giving a truly special education to the clones

do excite the suspicion of people, and, at the end of the book, as Kathy begins to come to terms

with her fate, the school is closed. Kathy knows that she is disposable, that she will never rise in the

world. But at the end of the book, her consciousness is raised to the extent that she can become a

center of resistance. She has not just settled for her lot in life. She has stepped outside the game of

her intended acquiescence with a Nietzschean zest that becomes a kind of affirmative amor fati.

Kathy finds out, at the end, that people are afraid of competing with the clones. In fact, they

fear that group bred to be subordinate will in fact be superior, will have the makings of a new

master class. Thus Hailsham’s rhetoric of individual distinction, however ersatz, is itself threatening,

and needs to be rolled back. The time-scheme that Ishiguro develop for his clones, the way he has

introduced them after 1945, is of course a necessary one considering the history of science, at only

at that point could science have been remotely as advanced to even make it plausible as a fantasy.

Yet 1945 was also, we recall, the year Labour came to power in Britain, and the existence of the

clones, the way they were permitted access to the illusion of privilege schooling at Hailsham,

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parallels the enfranchisement of the working class and everything that Scheler would see as

indicative of ressentiment run amok. But the experiment palls; society decides that an enfranchised

working class, however much it might flatter their sense of altruism and noblesse oblige, poses too

much a threat; they have to be put back in their place. The people who are not slaves, who are not

clones, only appear in Never Let Me Go, as administrators and supervisors, in effect jailers. But

somewhere off in some mirror land are people just like Kathy and who are living in a utopia where

there are not constraints. The search of the clones for their ‘possibles’--the people from which they

have been cloned--is an image of this mirror world, our own world, which is offstage. And it is this

offstage world which seeks to put the clones in their place, after once finding them useful and

eventually superfluous. Would, for this society, that this would be as easy as consigning Malvolio

back to a position of servitude! But the genie of consent and democracy is out of the bottle; the

bounds of order have been definitely burst; and the elite tightening their hold on power is not a

triumphant comic act of reconciliation, but simply a movement of counter-ressentiment, of

ressentiment trying to cure itself by transcending itself. Kathy is resigned to her death, but surely a

society of such triumphant cruelty cannot long endure. The utopia of unfettered initiative, freed

from the leveling mediocrity of ressentiment, is a utopia that tacitly depends on denying some

people in the society the right to be part of it.

Nietzsche did not wish to live in such a utopia, one which sought to sweep all pain, all

suffering, all inadequacy under the rug. He recognized not only the pain of human life but that we

somehow need this pain in order to live genuinely. Any mode of artificially inoculating ourselves

against this pain, whether through religion, culture, or politics, would have met with his sharp

disapproval; any attempt to transcend it by a utopia, whether the modernity dream of collective

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enfranchisement or counter-modernity’s of a relaunched elite, would meet with scepticism. Look at

these remarkable words on the Black Death of the fourteenth century:

“Human beings, often enough, get fed up: there are entire epidemics of this process of getting fed

up (for example, around 1348, at the time of the dance of death). But even this disgust, this

exhaustion, this dissatisfaction with himself—all this comes out of him so powerfully that it

immediately becomes a new chain. The No which he speaks to life brings to light, as if through a

magic spell, an abundance of more tender Yeses. Even when he injures himself, this master of

destruction and self-destruction, it is the wound itself which later forces him to live on” (GM, III, 13).

Acknowledging one’s wounds, learning to live with being fed up–-this is just what Leonora in

L’Heureux’s story will not do. Nietzsche’s ultimate strategy for trumping ressentiment may not be

to oust it, but to learn to live with it. This acknowledgment of wounds recalls Jean Genet’s idea of

the blessure secrete, the secret wound that at once epitomizes what we have in common and how

we are radically different from each other. Derrida recognized Genet’s articulation of primal

idiosyncracy, juxtaposing Genet to Hegel in the two columns of Glas. Nietzsche, who in a way

preemptively combines the two columns of Glas in one perpetually multi-tracked consciousness,

articulates this antagonistic, but indissoluble, bond between idiosyncracy and the weft which

contains and constrains it. The acknowledgment of the persistent of ressentiment is part of this

bond. In some ways, ressentiment is sublimation, in the Freudian sense, in other ways, it is like

supplementarity in the Derridean sense, as it is a snag at the back of all willfully self-sufficient

conceptions, a flaw preventing them from being subsistent. Like both sublimation and

supplementarity, ressentiment proceeds from a flaw in the ontological constitution; but it can be a

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way of staunching the wound of that flaw as well as exacerbating it. As Rebecca Stringer (267) puts

it, ressentiment is “an inevitable and potentially positive force.” Ressentiment can also be reparative

and comedic, transcending revenge. Ressentiment is certainly one stage further than the lex talionis,

which Nietzsche calls“the oldest form of astuteness” (GM II, 8). This is the difference between

Nietzsche, who premises ressentiment on the existence of law (GM, II, 11) , and one of his

inspirations, the economist Eugen Dühring, the chief agent behind the Nietzschean concept, who

begins the narrative only with an arbitrary act of force. It is the panicked wish to prematurely

dispense with the positive as well as the negative effects of ressentiment that counter-ressentiment

makes its mistake. In trying to square out ressentiment’s pitfalls, it creates a vindictive self-

righteousness with all the flaws of ressentiment–its expediency, its relativism, its rationalization of

the circumstances of one-time oppression into a status of permanent moral presumption--without its

good, or at least its bearable, aspects, which are its vulnerability, its admission that we are not gods,

its acknowledgment of plural and contesting social forces.

For Nietzsche, ressentiment can be generative. Indeed, in any analysis of the world as it is, one

that is descriptive and not prescriptive, it must be recognized as as one of the sustaining features of

existence. A return to a morality of good and bad is not in the cards in an immediate or even

intermediate political sense, given the extent to which moral relativism has been institutionalized.

Nietzsche does not view himself as the leader of a “Return of Good and Bad” party preparing to

launch a bid for power. The very fact that his works were published in his lifetime, and that the

Nachlass tacitly addresses an audience, means that Nietzsche concedes a spirit of Offenlichkeit, if

not quite in the later Habermasian sense of the term: a public-mindedness. In a society where good

and bad, not good and evil, were the dichotomy, power would be concentrated into the hands of

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such a homogenous few that publication of philosophical works would not be necessary or viable; in

the most humane version of such an elitist society, philosophical reflections might be privately

printed. But the very fact that Nietzsche had to publish his work, had to presume an audience for

his work, presumes the wide dissemination of power (at least the power to read, which is a not

unsubstantive power) among a diverse population many of which must be animated, in some sinew,

whether vestigial or foregrounded, by ressentiment. A society of ressentiment-mediated

offenlichkeit is nobody’s dream. But it is nobody’s nightmare either. For that precise reason it can

at least teeter on the brink of sufficing, to a bare extent, as everybody’s reality.

The Nietzschean cure of self-overcoming (GM III, 27) , of amor fati–a cure that half-knows its

own impossibility, is a far better ‘solution’ to the problem–the constitutive problem–of

ressentiment–than is a giddy trust in the redemptive capacities of counter-ressentiment, of

repudiating a leveling social equality, of a resurgent, arrogant initiative. In the wake of the raucous

dissonance of counter-modernity, Nietzsche’s understanding of the idiosyncrasy of all action, his

sense of the gestural nature of all systems, and his awareness of the need for “tact in reverence”

(GM, III, 22) wield an incalculable saving grace.

WORKS CITED

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Berkeley: U of California P, 1994, pp. 127-38.

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Studies, volume 26, number 1, autumn 2003., pp. 14-24.

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Frank, Robert., and Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society. New York: Free P, 1995.

Garber, Marjorie. Shakespeare After All. New York: Anchor, 2005.

Ishiguro, Kazuo Never Let Me Go. New York: Knopf, 2005.

Jung, Carl Gustav, On The Nature of the Psyche Tr. R. F. C. Hull

Princeton: Princeton UP, 1960

Large, Duncan. “Nietzsche’s Shakespearean Figures”. In Alan D. Schrift, ed.,Why Nietzsche Still?:

Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics. Berkeley: U of California P, 2000, pp. 45-65.

L’Heureux, John . “Brief Lives in California”. In R V Cassill and Richard Bausch, eds, Norton

Anthology of Short Fiction, New York: Norton, 2000.

Miller, Stephen.. Review of Peter Clecak’s Crooked Paths. In Commentary, March 1977: 94-96.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will To Power. Tr. And ed. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1968.

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Nussbaum, Martha. C. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and

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Pothen, Philip. Nietzsche And The Fate of Art. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.

Rahe, Paul. Republics: Ancient and Modern. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1994.

Scheler, Max. Ressentiment. Tr. William W. Holdheim. New York: Free P, 1961.

Shakespeare, William. Twlefth Night. Ed. Jonathan Crewe. Harmondsworth: Penguin,. 2000.

Solomon, Robert.”One Hundred Years of Ressentiment: The Genealogy of Morals.” In Richard

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Staude, John Raphael. Max Scheler, 1874-1928: AN Intellectual Portrait New

York: Free P, 1967.

Stringer, Rebecca. “A Nietzschean Breed: Femniism, Victimology, Ressentiment.” In Alan D.

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California P, 2000, pp. 247-73.

Tapper, Marion. “Ressentiment and Power”. In Paul Patton ed., Nietzsche, Feminism and

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