Noam
Chomsky's Official Site / By Noam Chomsky
Why Americans Know So
Much About Sports
But So Little About World Affairs The way the system is set up, there is
virtually nothing people can do anyway to influence the real world. 9/15/14
|
The following is a short
excerpt from a classic from Noam Chomsky's many published works, The Chomsky
Reader, which offers a unique insight on a question worth
asking -- how is it that we as a people can be so knowledgable about the
intricacies of various sports teams, yet be colossally ignorant about our
various undertakings abroad? QUESTION: You've written about the way that
professional ideologists and the mandarins obfuscate reality. And you have
spoken -- in some places you call it a "Cartesian common sense" -- of
the commonsense capacities of people. Indeed, you place a significant emphasis
on this common sense when you reveal the ideological aspects of arguments,
especially in contemporary social science. What do you mean by common sense?
What does it mean in a society like ours? For example, you've written that
within a highly competitive, fragmented society, it's very difficult for people
to become aware of what their interests are. If you are not able to participate
in the political system in meaningful ways, if you are reduced to the role of a
passive spectator, then what kind of knowledge do you have? How can common
sense emerge in this context?
CHOMSKY: Well, let me
give an example. When I'm driving, I sometimes turn on the radio and I find
very often that what I'm listening to is a discussion of sports. These are
telephone conversations. People call in and have long and intricate
discussions, and it's plain that quite a high degree of thought and analysis is
going into that. People know a tremendous amount. They know all sorts of
complicated details and enter into far-reaching discussion about whether the
coach made the right decision yesterday and so on. These are ordinary people,
not professionals, who are applying their intelligence and analytic skills in
these areas and accumulating quite a lot of knowledge and, for all I know,
understanding. On the other hand, when I hear people talk about, say,
international affairs or domestic problems, it's at a level of superficiality
that's beyond belief.
In part, this reaction
may be due to my own areas of interest, but I think it's quite accurate,
basically. And I think that this concentration on such topics as sports makes a
certain degree of sense. The way the system is set up, there is virtually
nothing people can do anyway, without a degree of organization that's far
beyond anything that exists now, to influence the real world. They might as
well live in a fantasy world, and that's in fact what they do. I'm sure they
are using their common sense and intellectual skills, but in an area which has
no meaning and probably thrives because it has no meaning, as a displacement
from the serious problems which one cannot influence and affect because the
power happens to lie elsewhere.
Now it seems to me that
the same intellectual skill and capacity for understanding and for accumulating
evidence and gaining information and thinking through problems could be used --
would be used -- under different systems of governance which involve popular
participation in important decision-making, in areas that really matter to
human life.
There are questions that
are hard. There are areas where you need specialized knowledge. I'm not
suggesting a kind of anti-intellectualism. But the point is that many things
can be understood quite well without a very far-reaching, specialized
knowledge. And in fact even a specialized knowledge in these areas is not
beyond the reach of people who happen to be interested....
QUESTION: Do you think
people are inhibited by expertise? CHOMSKY: There are also experts
about football, but these people don't defer to them. The people who call in
talk with complete confidence. They don't care if they disagree with the coach
or whoever the local expert is. They have their own opinion and they conduct
intelligent discussions. I think it's an interesting phenomenon. Now I don't
think that international or domestic affairs are much more complicated. And
what passes for serious intellectual discourse on these matters does not
reflect any deeper level of understanding or knowledge. One finds
something similar in the case of so-called primitive cultures. What you find
very often is that certain intellectual systems have been constructed of
considerable intricacy, with specialized experts who know all about it and
other people who don't quite understand and so on. For example, kinship systems
are elaborated to enormous complexity. Many anthropologists have tried to show
that this has some functional utility in the society. But one function may just
be intellectual. It's a kind of mathematics. These are areas where you can use
your intelligence to create complex and intricate systems and elaborate their
properties pretty much the way we do mathematics. They don't have mathematics
and technology; they have other systems of cultural richness and complexity. I
don't want to overdraw the analogy, but something similar may be happening
here.
The gas station attendant
who wants to use his mind isn't going to waste his time on international
affairs, because that's useless; he can't do anything about it anyhow, and he
might learn unpleasant things and even get into trouble. So he might as well do
it where it's fun, and not threatening -- professional football or basketball
or something like that. But the skills are being used and the understanding is
there and the intelligence is there. One of the functions that things like
professional sports play, in our society and others, is to offer an area to
deflect people's attention from things that matter, so that the people in power
can do what matters without public interference.
QUESTION: I asked a while
ago whether people are inhibited by the aura of expertise. Can one turn this
around -- are experts and intellectuals afraid of people who could apply the
intelligence of sport to their own areas of competency in foreign affairs,
social sciences, and so on?
CHOMSKY: I suspect that
this is rather common. Those areas of inquiry that have to do with problems of
immediate human concern do not happen to be particularly profound or
inaccessible to the ordinary person lacking any special training who takes the
trouble to learn something about them. Commentary on public affairs in the
mainstream literature is often shallow and uninformed. Everyone who writes and
speaks about these matters knows how much you can get away with as long as you
keep close to received doctrine. I'm sure just about everyone exploits these
privileges. I know I do. When I refer to Nazi crimes or Soviet atrocities, for
example, I know that I will not be called upon to back up what I say, but a detailed
scholarly apparatus is necessary if I say anything critical about the practice
of one of the Holy States: the United States itself, or Israel, since it was
enshrined by the intelligentsia after its 1967 victory. This freedom from the
requirements of evidence or even rationality is quite a convenience, as any
informed reader of the journals of public opinion, or even much of the
scholarly literature, will quickly discover. It makes life easy, and permits
expression of a good deal of nonsense or ignorant bias with impunity, also
sheer slander. Evidence is unnecessary, argument beside the point. Thus a
standard charge against American dissidents or even American liberals -- I've
cited quite a few cases in print and have collected many others -- is that they
claim that the United States is the sole source of evil in the world or other
similar idiocies; the convention is that such charges are entirely legitimate
when the target is someone who does not march in the appropriate parades, and
they are therefore produced without even a pretense of evidence. Adherence to
the party line confers the right to act in ways that would properly be regarded
as scandalous on the part of any critic of received orthodoxies. Too much
public awareness might lead to a demand that standards of integrity should be
met, which would certainly save a lot of forests from destruction, and would
send many a reputation tumbling.
The right to lie in the
service of power is guarded with considerable vigor and passion. This becomes
evident whenever anyone takes the trouble to demonstrate that charges against
some official enemy are inaccurate or, sometimes, pure invention. The immediate
reaction among the commissars is that the person is an apologist for the real
crimes of official enemies. The case of Cambodia is a striking example. That
the Khmer Rouge were guilty of gruesome atrocities was doubted by no one, apart
from a few marginal Maoist sects. It is also true, and easily documented, that
Western propaganda seized upon these crimes with great relish, exploiting them
to provide a retrospective justification for Western atrocities, and since
standards are nonexistent in such a noble cause, they also produced a record of
fabrication and deceit that is quite remarkable. Demonstration of this fact,
and fact it is, elicited enormous outrage, along with a stream of new and quite
spectacular lies, as Edward Herman and I, among others, have documented. The
point is that the right to lie in the service of the state was being
challenged, and that is an unspeakable crime. Similarly, anyone who points out
that some charge against Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, or some other official enemy
is dubious or false will immediately be labeled an apologist for real or
alleged crimes, a useful technique to ensure that rational standards will not
be imposed on the commissars and that there will be no impediment to their
loyal service to power. The critic typically has little access to the media,
and the personal consequences for the critic are sufficiently annoying to deter
many from taking this course, particularly because some journals -- the New
Republic, for example -- sink to the ultimate level of dishonesty and
cowardice, regularly refusing to permit even the right of response to slanders
they publish. Hence the sacred right to lie is likely to be preserved without
too serious a threat. But matters might be different if unreliable sectors of
the public were admitted into the arena of discussion and debate. The
aura of alleged expertise also provides a way for the indoctrination system to
provide its services to power while maintaining a useful image of indifference
and objectivity. The media, for example, can turn to academic experts to
provide the perspective that is required by the centers of power, and the university
system is sufficiently obedient to external power so that appropriate experts
will generally be available to lend the prestige of scholarship to the narrow
range of opinion permitted broad expression. Or when this method fails -- as in
the current case of Latin America, for example, or in the emerging discipline
of terrorology -- a new category of "experts" can be established who
can be trusted to provide the approved opinions that the media cannot express
directly without abandoning the pretense of objectivity that serves to
legitimate their propaganda function. I've documented many examples, as have
others.
The guild structure of
the professions concerned with public affairs also helps to preserve doctrinal
purity. In fact, it is guarded with much diligence. My own personal experience
is perhaps relevant. As I mentioned earlier, I do not have the usual
professional credentials in any field, and my own work has ranged fairly
widely. Some years ago, for example, I did some work in mathematical linguistics
and automata theory, and occasionally gave invited lectures at mathematics or
engineering colloquia. No one would have dreamed of challenging my credentials
to speak on these topics -- which were zero, as everyone knew; that would have
been laughable. The participants were concerned with what I had to say, not my
right to say it. But when I speak, say, about international affairs, I'm
constantly challenged to present the credentials that authorize me to enter
this august arena, in the United States, at least -- elsewhere not. It's a fair
generalization, I think, that the more a discipline has intellectual substance,
the less it has to protect itself from scrutiny, by means of a guild structure.
The consequences with regard to your question are pretty obvious.
QUESTION: You have said
that most intellectuals end up obfuscating reality. Do they understand the
reality they are obfuscating? Do they understand the social processes they
mystify? CHOMSKY: Most people are not liars. They can't tolerate too much
cognitive dissidence. I don't want to deny that there are outright liars, just
brazen propagandists. You can find them in journalism and in the academic
professions as well. But I don't think that's the norm. The norm is obedience,
adoption of uncritical attitudes, taking the easy path of self-deception. I
think there's also a selective process in the academic professions and
journalism. That is, people who are independent minded and cannot be trusted to
be obedient don't make it, by and large. They're often filtered out along the
way. [...] From The Chomsky Reader, as published on Noam
Chomsky's personal site. (Serpents Tail Publishing, 1988).